What a ____ thing to do! Formally characterizing actions by their expected effects by WOOD, Dustin et al.
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences 
6-2015 
What a ____ thing to do! Formally characterizing actions by their 
expected effects 
Dustin WOOD 
Wake Forest University 
William TOV 
Singapore Management University, williamtov@smu.edu.sg 
Cory COSTELLO 
Wake Forest University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research 
 Part of the Personality and Social Contexts Commons, and the Social Psychology Commons 
Citation 
WOOD, Dustin, TOV, William, & COSTELLO, Cory.(2015). What a ____ thing to do! Formally characterizing 
actions by their expected effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 108(6), 953-976. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2005 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional 
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School 
of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. 
For more information, please email library@smu.edu.sg. 








A number of personality frameworks assume traits describe central tendencies of action—for instance,
calling someone assertive indicates they have a tendency to perform assertive actions. But what makes
it appropriate to characterize an action by terms like assertive, kind, or honest? We propose that actions
are characterized by such terms in large part by having expected effects on the environment which match
particular conceptual templates. In the present studies, we attempt to better identify the expected effect
dimensions perceivers seem to utilize to make action characterizations related to the Big Five and
HEXACO personality dimensions. To do so, a set of 150 situation-action scenarios were generated from
actions suggestive of conscientiousness-related characteristics (Study 1), and of characteristics in other
HEXACO domains (Study 2). Participants then characterized each action on a range of bipolar
dimensions (e.g., assertive vs. submissive). A separate group of raters coded the expected effects of
performing these actions on 21 different outcomes (e.g., effort expenditure; achievement of career goals).
Action characterizations were highly predicted by expected effect dimensions in ways that matched
provisional hypotheses and were consistent across studies. Furthermore, actions characterizations tended
to be highly diagnostic of self-reported individual differences in the same characteristics. We discuss
implications for a range of phenomena, such as understanding the relations between behaviors and traits,
integrating trait models and decision-making models, and understanding the effect of situational features
on personality traits.
Keywords: action characterization, concepts, formative models, expectancy-value models, personality
traits
Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000030.supp
In the first minutes of the 2009 movie Star Trek, a powerful
enemy starship emerges from a mysterious “lightning storm” in
space and begins firing on the nearby Starship Kelvin. The
Kelvin’s Captain Robau decides to board the enemy starship to
negotiate, and appoints George Kirk as interim captain, telling
him to evacuate the passengers of the ship and set it on
auto-pilot to collide with the enemy starship if he is not back
within 15 min. However, when the enemy captain kills Robau
and resumes firing on the Kelvin, George finds that the ship’s
auto-pilot controls have been destroyed. What should he do?
George quickly orders all nonessential personnel off the ship
and pilots the Kelvin into the enemy starship himself. In doing
so, he completes Robau’s final order and buys time for the
Kelvin’s passengers to escape, but dies as a consequence. From
this brief scene, we are supposed to infer—without being told
directly—that James T. Kirk’s father was courageous, bold,
selfless, decisive, reliable, and honorable.
Understanding whether people and actions should be ascribed
characteristics such as this is a central concern of person
perception and personality assessment. Many of the terms
above are conceptually linked to the Big Five domains of
extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness, which are
among the most important action tendencies people want to
learn about one another (Goldberg, 1981; Srivastava, 2010;
Wood, in press). This article concerns how we can formally
represent whether particular actions, and the people who enact
them, should be characterized by such terms. We describe these
as the highly related issues of action characterization and trait
identification, respectively. We begin by describing some
prominent approaches to these issues within personality psy-
chology, and some of their limitations. We then present a
framework for understanding how perceivers determine that a
given action should be described by particular characteristics.
This article was published Online First January 26, 2015.
Dustin Wood, Department of Psychology, Wake Forest University;
William Tov, School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management Univer-
sity; Cory Costello, Department of Psychology, Wake Forest University.
Cory Costello is now at the Department of Psychology at the University
of Oregon.
We thank Jaap Denissen, Peter Harms, Nicholette Heim, Ryne Sherman,
and Christian Waugh for helpful comments on a draft of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Dustin
Wood, Wake Forest University, Department of Psychology, 438 Greene






































































































Journal of Personality and Social Psychology © 2015 American Psychological Association
2015, Vol. 108, No. 6, 953–976 0022-3514/15/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000030
953
Published  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2015, 108 (6), 953-976.
DOI: 10.1037/pspp0000030
Creative Comm ns Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
Accepted version
In brief, we argue that perceivers describe actions by particular
terms when their expected effects on the situation match certain
conceptual templates. We then describe how these conceptual
templates can be identified.
Formative Conceptions of Actions and
Behavioral Traits
One of the more prominent frameworks for understanding how
behavioral traits relate to specific actions is the Act Frequency
Approach (AFA; Buss & Craik, 1983). This approach operation-
alizes an individual’s level of a trait (e.g., assertiveness) by a
three-step process. First, one group nominates a large number of
acts that are indicative of a certain trait. Next, a second group rates
the extent to which each act is a “prototypical” indicator of the
trait. For example, participants might determine that “using a day
planner” is not a prototypically assertive action, whereas “arguing
for a pay raise” is more prototypically assertive. Finally, a third
group reports how frequently they perform the behaviors over a
window of time.
The AFA model can be considered a formative model in the
sense that an individual’s level of performance of certain types of
actions is understood as forming (or establishing) their level of the
trait (Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000). In such models, if the individual
does not perform the types of actions which are prototypical of the
trait, the individual is considered not to have the trait by definition
(Buss & Craik, 1983; Wiggins, 1997). We can represent this view
of traits using a simple conceptual equation:
Trait Level  E(Trait-Identifying Actions) (1)
This operationalizes an individual’s trait level as the expected
level or observed rate of trait-identifying actions—the set of ac-
tions which if performed identify the individual as having the trait
(Buss & Craik, 1983). Research has indicated that individual
differences in rates of prototypical actions can correlate very
highly with self-reported levels of the relevant trait. For instance,
self-reported conscientiousness correlated .68 with self-reported
rates of performing actions categorized as prototypical of consci-
entiousness, and .37 with rates of these actions reported in daily
diary studies over 2 weeks (Jackson et al., 2010).
Other approaches have similar conceptions of how actions relate
to traits. The Density Distribution Approach (DDA; Fleeson, 2001;
Fleeson & Gallagher, 2009) theorizes that a person’s trait level can
be understood as a central tendency of personality states. The
Personality and Role Identity Structural Model (PRISM; Wood &
Roberts, 2006) theorizes that people form general self-perceptions
in large part by translating their own specific behaviors first into
contextualized identities (e.g., “How conscientious I am as a
[friend/spouse/coworker]?”), which in turn are integrated into a
more singular identity (“How conscientious I am in general?”).
Perhaps the major difference between these approaches from the
AFA is that rather than asking participants how often they perform
specific acts (e.g., “How often do you make your bed?”), the DDA
and PRISM approaches have participants translate their actions
into more abstract trait terms themselves (e.g., “How conscientious
are you acting at the moment?”). Using this approach, Fleeson and
Gallagher (2009) found that the aggregated reports of personality
states over several days or weeks correlated between .42 and .56
with self-reported personality traits.
More generally, a number of frameworks consider major struc-
tural personality factors such as the Big Five and HEXACO
dimensions as first and foremost being summaries or descriptions
rather than causes of action tendencies (Saucier & Goldberg, 1996;
Wiggins, 1997). From this perspective, such personality factors
might be regarded first and foremost as indicating action tenden-
cies that are particularly valuable for a perceiver to learn about an
actor rather than approximating the sources of these actions (Buss,
2011; Srivastava, 2010; Wood, in press).
Research on formative approaches indicates that there is a fair
amount of consensus among raters concerning which actions are
“prototypical” of a trait (Buss & Craik, 1983), and that acts judged
to be prototypical are indeed good predictors of more abstract trait
perceptions (Jackson et al., 2010; Moskowitz, 1994). However,
there is also a dramatic level of heterogeneity in the specific acts
that are deemed relevant to a given characteristic. For instance,
actions characterized as prototypically “conscientious” range from
bringing the right materials to class or work, double checking
one’s work, correcting incorrect change given at a store, address-
ing people formally (as Mr., Mrs., etc.), ironing one’s clothes,
volunteering to do things at work, and standing up straight (Jack-
son et al., 2010). However, an interesting limitation of formative
approaches is that they are largely agnostic concerning the features
of an action that make it trait-identifying.
Similarly, the DDA and PRISM approaches implicitly assume
that individuals are able to accurately translate particular actions
into abstract characterizations. In essence, we trust that partici-
pants know an action’s trait relevance when they see it. The
existence of high interjudge agreement indicates that this is true to
a considerable extent, but again the specific features that influence
the characterization of particular acts are not well-articulated (Hol-
mes, 2004; Kelley, 1997).
To make matters more difficult, what is nominally the same
action can mean very different things when it is performed in
different circumstances (Corr, 2009; Tausczik & Pennebaker,
2010). For instance, “breaking rules in a game” was identified as
a prototypically unconscientious act by Jackson et al. (2010).
However, in certain circumstances this could alternatively or ad-
ditionally be a kind and generous act (e.g., if the person did this to
keep a friend from losing), a creative act (e.g., if this way of
breaking the rules had never occurred to others), a submissive act
(e.g., if they didn’t want to but felt coerced to do so), and even a
conscientious act (e.g., if doing so required concerted effort and
planning, and fulfilled a promise made to someone else).
Defining and Characterizing Actions
Our thesis is that perceivers describe an action by a particular
characteristic when the action’s expected effects on the environ-
ment match the characteristic’s conceptual template. This is fairly
close to understanding behavioral dispositions as an individual’s
tendencies to “restructure the field” (Lewin, 1946) or to “transform
one situation into another one” (Kelley, 1997, p. 148; Holmes,
2004), and to the functionalist understanding that “things are what
they do” (Tomasello, 2002, p. 5). Additionally, we expect the key
features perceivers utilize to characterize an action are its expected
effects rather than its actual effects. The former concern the
outcomes made more likely by the action, whereas the latter






































































































954 WOOD, TOV, AND COSTELLO
terizations hinges on an action’s expected effects was suggested by
Wiggins (1997):
The requirement that a specific outcome must occur [to characterize
an action by a particular term] is too strong. Not all aggressive actions
result in harm or injury. If John takes a swing at the boy with a meat
axe and misses, the action is still unambiguously “aggressive.” . . . It
seems appropriate to state what I believe is meant when a trait quality
is attributed to an action: the action belongs to a class of actions that
are likely to lead to a particular outcome.” (pp. 100–101; author’s
italics).
More generally, to characterize an action by a particular term, it
should be sufficient to know that the action increases the likeli-
hood (i.e., mathematical expectation) of certain outcomes (a) rel-
ative to alternative actions that could be performed; and (b) re-
gardless of whether the outcomes actually do occur. For instance,
we might call an action reckless if it increased the risk of physical
harm to oneself and others relative to alternatives, even if no harm
ultimately resulted. Similarly, George Kirk’s actions may have had
the expected effects of saving the Kelvin’s passengers, but perhaps
through bad luck George lands only a glancing blow to the enemy
starship, and his attempt to save the Kelvin’s passengers conse-
quently fails. Despite this, George’s action might still be regarded
as honorable, selfless, and altruistic on the basis of its expected
rather than actual effects.
Below we describe how an action’s expected effects and an
action characterization’s conceptual template can be formally rep-
resented. In Table 1, we summarize definitions for important
terminology for understanding this process.
Formally Representing an Action’s Expected and
Actual Effects
To establish an action’s expected effects, it is necessary to consider
how the situation following the performance of the action compares
with the situation that would be expected to exist if the actor had
performed one or more alternative (i.e., counterfactual) actions (Pearl,
2000). For instance, we can formally represent the situation faced by
George Kirk in a “decision tree” similar to those found in a range of
game theoretical and judgment/decision-making frameworks (e.g.,
Gintis, 2009; Hastie & Dawes, 2010; Krantz & Kunreuther, 2007).
Figure 1 shows the potential actions that George might be considering
(e.g., Action a: attack the enemy starship; b: try to negotiate; c: do
nothing), the situations that might be expected to result from these
actions (e.g., if he attacks, Situation a1: his attack succeeds; a2: his
attack fails). The same information can be represented more formally
Table 1
Definitions of Important Terms for Formalizing Action Valuation and
Characterization Processes
Term Definition
Action characterization The process of applying a particular conceptual term to a particular action.
(e.g., “the action was kind, assertive, industrious”)
Trait identification The process of applying a particular conceptual term to a particular actor
(or object, system).
(e.g., “the individual is kind, assertive, industrious”)
Trait-identifying actions The set of actions which identify, form, establish the individual’s level of
a given trait
Situation A configuration of various features in the environment (e.g., level of
status, peer acceptance, attention from others).
Action matrix (A) A matrix representing the likelihood that particular actions performed by
an actor (listed in rows) will result in particular outcome situations
(listed in columns).
Situation matrix (S) A matrix representing various outcome situations (listed in rows), and the
expected levels of more specific situational features (listed in columns).
Expected outcomes matrix (E) A matrix detailing the situational features expected after performing a
particular action, averaged across all possible outcome situations
weighted by their likelihood. Estimated by multiplying A and S matrices
(E  A  S).
Expected effects (of an action) The differences in the situational features expected by performing one
action relative to performing an alternative action. Estimated by
subtracting two rows of the E matrix.
Valuation matrix (V) A matrix representing the extent to which particular situational features
(listed in rows) receive weight within a particular valuation or
conceptual template (listed in columns).
Valuation template Specifies the particular situational features that are considered (i.e., receive
non-zero weight;   0) in the actor’s decision-making process.
Conceptual template Specifies the particular situational features that are considered (i.e., receive
non-zero weight;   0) in the perceiver’s decision of how to
characterize an action.
Functionality matrix (F) Summarizes the expected functionality of each action (when using
valuation templates) or expected characterizations of each action (when
using conceptual templates). Estimated by multiplying the A, S, and V
matrices (F  A  S  V) or E and V matrices (F  E  V).
Note. Concepts have been ordered roughly from simplest to most complex, with latter concepts frequently






































































































955CHARACTERIZING ACTIONS BY THEIR EXPECTED EFFECTS
in an Action matrix (A) as done in Table 2, where potential actions are
displayed in rows, potential outcome situations in columns, and the
probabilities that a given outcome situations will result from a par-
ticular action are given in the cells. For example, if the enemy starship
is attacked (Action a), there may be a 90% chance that the situation
will resolve such that he dies but most other Kelvin passengers survive
(Situation a1), and a 10% chance that it will resolve such that his
attack fails and all Kelvin passengers die (Situation a2).
Each of the potential outcomes of a set of actions can be more
formally represented in a Situation matrix (S). Each row in the S
matrix indicates the total nature of the environment if a particular
situation were realized, and each column indicates a specific feature of
the environment. Returning to our example, George may consider a
range of outcomes of his action (e.g., whether he will be alive, what
percentage of the Kelvin passengers will be alive). In Table 2, we see
that if George attacks the enemy ship and his attack succeeds (i.e.,
Situation a1 is realized), perhaps 95% of the Kelvin’s passengers
would survive. However, if his attack fails (i.e., Situation a2 is
realized), 0% of the Kelvin’s passengers would survive.
We can combine the information in the Action and Situation
matrices via matrix multiplication to estimate an expected outcomes
matrix (E  A  S). This matrix details the expected level of
particular situational features resulting from each action. Expected
levels are estimated as a mathematical expectation averaged across all
possible outcomes, weighted by their probability of resulting from the
action. These correspond to the expectancies described in expectancy-
value models (Feather, 1982). In the case of George Kirk, by com-
bining the probabilities that his attack may succeed or fail, we find the
expected level of Kelvin passengers surviving after initiating his
attack should be 86% (i.e., .90  .95  .10  0  .855) of those
existing beforehand (see Table 2).
We are now prepared to formally represent an action’s expected
effects which we have described as central to action characterizations.
The expected effects of a given action concern the difference between
the situational states expected to exist by performing the action and
those expected to exist by performing some counterfactual action.
This can be estimated as the difference of two rows in the expected
outcomes matrix (E):
Expected Effects of Action i (relative to Action i)
 Ei  Ei, (2)
Referring to the E matrix in Table 2, if George performs Action
a (evacuate the ship and sacrifice himself), the expected effect on
the survival of the Kelvin’s passengers relative to Action b (try to
negotiate) would be Ea  Eb  86%  10%  76%. This
indicates 76% more passengers are expected to live by performing
Action a than Action b. The actual effects of George’s action are
defined similarly, with the difference computed between the situ-
ation that actually transpired from the action (Situation a1, George
dies but Kelvin passengers survive) and the counterfactual situa-
tion that would have existed if he performed a different action
(e.g., Situation b2, George tries to negotiate, but everyone dies).1
1 A tempting alternative for operationalizing an action’s expected or actual
effects may be to compare the action’s expected or actual outcomes of performing
the action with the initial situation (i.e., Sij  S0), which we can call a “situation
change” estimate. This temporal operationalization seems to follow fairly intui-
tively from the conception of action tendencies as being tendencies to “transform
one situation into another one” (Kelley, 1997, p. 148; Lewin, 1946; Minsky, 2007).
The problem with operationalizing the action’s effects in this manner can be
illustrated with our example. Ultimately the number of Kelvin passengers alive
after George Kirk’s attack was perhaps 5% fewer than existed initially (i.e.,
95–100%). However, despite the decrease in the number of people alive after
George’s action, it feels incorrect to characterize his action as murderous. This is
almost certainly because perceivers intuitively compare his action with counter-
factual states of “what would have happened if George had done something else?”
Because his actions seemed to save more lives than any plausible counterfactual
actions, it feels more appropriate to characterize his action as honorable and
selfless.
Figure 1. Graphical representation of some of potential actions George Kirk might perform in response to
being attacked by a powerful alien starship, and the potential situations that might result from these actions. A






































































































956 WOOD, TOV, AND COSTELLO
An important point to emphasize is that the expected and actual
outcomes of performing an action will usually differ unless we are
certain of what the outcome of the individual’s actions will be. We
know that George Kirk’s attack ultimately resulted in 95% of the
Kelvin’s passengers surviving—this is the actual outcome of his
action. In contrast, prior to the action, the expected outcome was
only 86% of the passengers surviving, estimated by accounting for
the fact that his attack could fail. Stated another way: performing
a particular action will ultimately resolve into only one of the
outcome situations shown in the rows of the S matrix (if we have
represented the possible outcomes accurately); however, before the
action has been performed, the outcome is indeterminate. An
interesting consequence of this is that performing an action can
simultaneously be expected to increase the likelihood of experi-
encing a positive change and a negative change on a single feature
of the situation. For instance, making a high-stakes bet increases
the likelihood of both dramatically increasing and dramatically
decreasing one’s income, and asking a friend out on a date in-
creases the likelihood of both increasing and decreasing one’s
connection with the person (e.g., sparking a romance vs. straining
the friendship). However, because such outcomes are mutually
exclusive, the actual situation will ultimately resolve into only the
positive or negative change on the situational feature.
Characterized Actions by Comparisons to
Conceptual Templates
More generally, we argue that an action is characterized by a
particular term when it shares features with other actions charac-
terized by that term, similar to the family resemblance understand-
ing of how natural objects are categorized (Buss & Craik, 1983;
Rosch & Mervis, 1975). However, we argue that the most impor-
tant features to action characterizations are those which concern
how the action is expected to affect the environment. We consider
the effects that are central to characterizing an action in a particular
way as constituting its conceptual template—or its conceptual
skeleton (Hofstadter & Sander, 2013). For instance, the features of
George Kirk’s action share few similarities with other actions that
may be prototypically selfless (e.g., George’s involved starships,
cosmic lightning storms, broken autopilot controls, photon torpe-
does). It is only the fact that his action matches a small number of
more abstract functional features—for example, the expected ef-
fects of his action on his well-being and the well-being of others—
that make it sensible to characterize George’s action by this term
(Holmes, 2004; Kelley, 1997).
Valuation templates and conceptual templates. Conceptual
templates can be thought of as highly analogous to the valuation
templates that are central to understanding decision-making within
a range of economic, game theoretical, and judgment/decision-
making models (e.g., Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, & Kautz,
2011; Gintis, 2009; Hastie & Dawes, 2010). Specifically, valua-
tion templates (or preference functions) concern how an individual
evaluates the functionality of potential actions, whereas conceptual
templates concern how the individual should characterize these
potential actions. We thus continue by describing how valuation
templates function in decision-making processes, and how the
conceptual templates that define action characterizations operate in
essentially the same manner.
In decision-making models, individuals are regularly under-
stood as selecting actions that will result in the outcomes they most
value, given the valuation template active at the time the decision
is made (Almlund et al., 2011; Gintis, 2009; Krantz & Kunreuther,
2007). We can think of a valuation template as a vector which
indicates the situational features that receive weight in the actor’s
decision-making process. In the language of multiple regression,
there are several effects that a particular action will have relative
to alternatives, but only some of these will receive values of || 
0 toward guiding the actor’s decision. As shown in Figure 1 and
Table 2, we might represent George Kirk as placing a large amount
of weight on “fulfilling his commitments” and on the “safety/
welfare of Kelvin passengers,” and some positive weight, but
considerably less, on “his own safety.” A different “selfish person”
might instead weight only his own safety. As shown in Table 2, we
can multiply the action (A), situation (S), and valuation (V) matri-
ces together to determine the expected functionality (F) of the
actions the individual might consider in a particular situation,
using the equation below:
Expected Functionality of Potential Actions : F  A  S  V
(3)
By doing this in our example, we see that given George’s
valuation template, his choice among the three potential actions
becomes clear: the best option is to initiate the life-sacrificing
attack, because this is likely to save the most lives. In contrast, if
George instead had a selfish person’s valuation template, his best
option would be to try to negotiate with the enemy captain, since
this has the greatest likelihood of saving his own life.
The level of similarity between the role of valuation templates
for guiding behavioral decisions and the role of conceptual tem-
plates for characterizing actions may be difficult to overstate. As
shown particularly in the valuation matrix depicted in Table 2, we
can formally specify conceptual templates for judging whether an
action is selfish or dependable in precisely the same manner as an
actor’s valuation template. Further more, in economic and
decision-making models, we can “reveal” an actor’s valuation
template by (a) placing the actor in situations containing various
features, and (b) determining how the actor’s responses are con-
tingent on these features (Hitsch, Hortaçsu, & Ariely, 2010; Samu-
elson, 1948; Wood & Brumbaugh, 2009). To estimate George’s
valuation template in Table 2, we might determine that throughout
his life, he tended to act in ways that were more expected to fulfill
his commitments than to maximize self-serving goals. Analo-
gously, we should be able to indirectly “reveal” the conceptual
templates associated with action characterizations such as those in
Table 2 by (a) providing judges with actions varying in their
expected effects, and (b) determining how the judges’ character-
izations of an action are contingent on these effects.
However, beyond similarities such as these, there are some
subtle differences between valuation and conceptual templates,
which we elaborate below.
Template simplicity. Consistent with the analogous term
conceptual skeleton (Hofstadter & Sander, 2013), we can regard a
conceptual template as being the “bare bones” set of features
necessary to characterize an action in a particular manner. Whereas
people might place weight on many situational features in their






































































































957CHARACTERIZING ACTIONS BY THEIR EXPECTED EFFECTS
templates might be relatively well-specified by a very small num-
ber of features. For instance, Wiggins (1997) suggested an action
might be relatively well-characterized as aggressive principally by
whether it has the expected effect of “[others] being harmed,
injured, discomforted, or ridiculed” (p. 101). Similarly, we might
judge an action as dependable principally on the basis of whether
it “fulfills commitments to others.”
Many conceptual templates will require two or more distinct
effects in order to be adequately specified. For instance, as re-
flected in Table 2, we might characterize an action as selfish if it
is expected to “benefit oneself” and additionally “neglect commit-
ments” or “increase harm to others.” Conversely, Nowak (2006)
defined a cooperator as an actor who “pays a cost” for another
person to “receive a benefit” (p. 1560). However, we expect the
conceptual templates associated with most action characterizations
will typically be relatively simple. That is, they should be rela-
tively well-specified by placing nonzero weights on only a small
number of distinct effect dimensions.
Table 2
Matrix Representation of George Kirk’s Potential Actions, and Their Expected Outcomes, Valuations, and Characterizations
Simple matrices
Outcome situations
Action matrix (A) a1 a2 b1 b2 c1 c2
Actions
a) Evacuate  self-sacrificing attack 0.90 0.10 0 0 0 0
b) Try to negotiate 0 0 0.10 0.90 0 0
c) Do nothing (“inaction”) 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.95
Levels of situational features
Situation matrix (S) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Outcome situations
(a1) George dead, Kelvin passengers alive 1 0 0.75 0 0.95 0.75 1
(a2) Glancing blow to enemy, all Kelvin dead 1 0 0.90 0 0 1 1
(b1) Negotiation works: Everyone lives 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
(b2) Negotiation fails: All Kelvin dead 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
(c1) Enemy moves along: Everyone lives 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
(c2) Enemy attacks: All Kelvin dead 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Valuation templates Conceptual templates
Valuation matrix (V) George Kirk Selfish person Honorable Reliable Decisive Selfish
Situational Features
1. Commitments fulfilled 0.4 0 0.4 1 0 0.2
2. Integrity of Kelvin 0 0 0 0 0 0
3. Integrity of enemy starship 0 0 0 0 0 0
4. Alive? 0.1 1 0.1 0 0 0.6
5. Passengers alive? 0.5 0 0.4 0 0 0.2
6. Enemy captain alive? 0 0 0 0 0 0
7. Performed an action? 0 0 0.1 0 1 0
Combined matrices
Levels of situational features
Expected outcome matrix (E  A  S) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Action
(a) Evacuate  self-sacrificing attack 1 0 0.77 0 0.86 0.78 1
(b) Try to negotiate 0 0.10 1 0.10 0.10 1 1
(c) Do nothing (“inaction”) 0 0.05 1 0.05 0.05 1 0
Functionality matrix
(F  A  S  V, or F  E  V)
Action valuations Action characterizations
George Kirk Selfish Person Honorable Reliable Decisive Selfish
Actions
(a) Evacuate  self-sacrificing attack 0.83 0 0.84 1 1 0.37
(b) Try to negotiate 0.06 0.10 0.13 0 1 0.04
(c) Do nothing (“inaction”) 0.03 0.05 0.02 0 0 0.02
Note. Cells in the A matrix indicate likelihood that a particular action will result in a particular situation. Levels of all “situational features” in the S matrix
are given on a 0 to 1 scale (0  feature absent/low, 1  feature present/high), and templates in the V matrix are constructed such that weights in each column
sum to 1. Within the final F or A  S  V matrix, the highest value in each column is shown in bold and underlined, and should be the action selected






































































































958 WOOD, TOV, AND COSTELLO
Conceptual templates should be relatively invariant. A
conceptual template should be relatively invariant across a range
of situations. Whether a specific action should be characterized by
a particular term depends on how well its expected effects match
the term’s conceptual template—much like a key fitting a lock. If
the action has effects on the situational features which receive
weight within the conceptual template, the action can be described
appropriately by the associated term. But the range of actions that
fit a single conceptual template is vast—as illustrated by the Star
Trek example. Presumably no one would have suggested “initiat-
ing a life-sacrificing attack after the autopilot controls of your
starship are destroyed” as a prototypically selfless act in an AFA
study. However, it is readily characterized as an instance of self-
less action by perceivers. The specification of an abstract concep-
tual template (e.g., if: the action is expected to “help others” and
“harm oneself,” then: characterize the act as selfless) allows an
infinite number of specific actions to be understood as examples of
a particular characteristic (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1997).
Conceptual templates can be correctly specified. Conceptual
templates can be regarded as correctly specified to the extent that
they match the consensual standard within a population. If an
individual uses a term in a different way from others (e.g., “he
acted assertively when he said nothing in class, and then followed
orders he strongly disagreed with”), we are generally comfortable
saying that the individual is using the term incorrectly.
The sense that conceptual templates can be correctly specified in
turn allows us to understand some ways in which traits should be
considered as “real” (Funder, 1991, 1995). As discussed and
formalized in Equation 1, within formative models an individual
can be accurately described by specific trait adjectives if there is a
high expectation that the individual performs trait-identifying ac-
tions. In turn, a “trait-identifying action” can be understood as an
action which has expected effects matching the trait’s conceptual
template.
A given action can fit multiple conceptual templates.
Another point that can be seen in Table 2 is that a single action
invariably has a broad range of effects, or is multifinal (Katz &
Shapiro, 1985; Kruglanski et al., 2002; Wood, Gardner, & Harms,
in press). As shown in Table 2, compared with other options
George Kirk may have considered, the action he ultimately per-
formed showed a greater expectation of fulfilling a commitment to
the previous captain, saving lives, damaging the enemy starship,
and ending his own life, among other things. A given action can be
characterized by all of the terms that fit its diverse effects. For
instance, we might characterize George Kirk’s action as being
brave, honorable, dependable, selfless, bold, generous, and deci-
sive on the basis of the fact that his action’s expected effects
matched the conceptual templates associated with all of these
characterizations.
Overview of the Current Studies
The central goal of the present studies is to develop empirically
informed “drafts” of the conceptual templates associated with
important action characterizations. We focused on terms that were
related to the Big Five and HEXACO traits, such as sociable,
dependable, honest, kind, and intelligent, as characteristics within
these domains are considered among the most socially important
action tendencies by personality psychologists and lay persons
(Ashton & Lee, 2007; Goldberg, 1981; Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin,
2014; Wood, in press).
As we have noted, the conceptual templates associated with a
given action characterization can be formally specified in precisely
the same manner as the valuation templates that guide an actor’s
behavioral decisions. As such, we should be able to infer which
expected effect dimensions receive weight in a conceptual tem-
plate by adapting revealed preference methodologies used to es-
timate the weights within an actor’s valuation template (Hastie &
Dawes, 2010; Samuelson, 1948; Wood & Brumbaugh, 2009).
Formally, the present studies can be considered as helping to
identify the conceptual templates (columns of the V matrix in
Table 2) by examining which expected effect dimensions (columns
of the E matrix) successfully predict action characterizations (col-
umns in the F matrix; see Table 2). As applied to the current
studies, we use this method to show that an action’s characteriza-
tions can be strongly predicted by its expected effects on a situa-
tion, and thus provide evidence regarding the specific nature of
associated conceptual templates.
Additionally, a common prediction of formative trait models,
formalized in Equation 1, is that describing someone by a trait term
implies their likelihood of performing relevant actions (Buss &
Craik, 1983; Fleeson & Gallagher, 2009; Wiggins, 1997). Thus,
we expected that actions characterized by a certain term by one set
of participants (e.g., assertive) would be more diagnostic of indi-
vidual differences in self-reported levels of the same trait among a
different set of participants (e.g., more predictive of the actor’s
assertiveness).
In Figure 2, we detail the steps we followed in testing our
hypotheses. We began with a preliminary study to identify poten-
tial trait-identifying actions and key expected effect dimensions
(Steps 1–2). In Studies 1 and 2, our team then created brief
situation–action scenarios (Step 3) that served as the main stimuli
for testing the links among conceptual templates, action charac-
terizations, and trait diagnosticities (Steps 4–5).
Preliminary Study: Generating a List of Important
Action Effect Dimensions
We began with fairly minimal a priori hypotheses concerning
the specific effect dimensions that might be necessary to charac-
terize an action by particular terms. However, to empirically
identify the extent to which action characterizations can be pre-
dicted from their expected effects, it is important to first identify a
set of effect dimensions to measure. We thus began by conducting
a somewhat informal qualitative investigation to identify effect
dimensions that might be most relevant to important action char-
acterizations. An initial group of participants provided examples of
actions that they felt illustrated particular characteristics. These
examples were then examined by members of two research teams
to identify effect dimensions that might be particularly important
to the conceptual template.
Method
Participants
A total of 275 participants from Wake Forest University (WFU)






































































































959CHARACTERIZING ACTIONS BY THEIR EXPECTED EFFECTS
(SMU) introductory psychology classes were asked to describe
instances exemplifying various characteristics at the end of a
different study. Of these, 12 WFU participants and three SMU
participants did not provide answers to these questions. To ensure
anonymity, demographic information was not collected with this
portion of the survey, but results from the broader survey indicated
that females made up approximately 59% of the WFU sample
(Mage  18.6) and 52% of the SMU sample (Mage  21.8).
Generation of Acts
Participants were randomly assigned to write about one of 18
possible pairs of characteristics. These characteristics were se-
lected (a) to provide three from each of the six HEXACO dimen-
sions (Ashton & Lee, 2007); and (b) to provide as diverse a set of
characteristics as possible. The two characteristics in a given pair
were selected to be highly antonymous (e.g., truthful/honest and
untruthful/dishonest). The 18 pairs, or 36 characteristics in total,
are listed in the Table S1 of the Supplementary Materials.
First, participants described someone displaying high levels of a
given characteristic (e.g., truthful/honest) with the following in-
structions:
Think of someone you know who is very [characteristic]. (This can be
anyone you know, such as a friend, enemy, acquaintance, or family
member. Please refer to this person only by their initials or as “X.”)
Please describe one or two situations in which this person acted in this
manner, providing details about the situation the person was in and
how they acted or responded in this situation to illustrate how this
person is [characteristic].
Second, the task was repeated for the antonymous characteristic
(e.g., untruthful/dishonest). Next, the same participants were in-
structed to “Think of times where you have acted or felt very
[characteristic]”—with the task repeated for both characteristics in
the pair. Thus, each participant provided four action descriptions in
total.
Generation of Action Effects and Provisional
Conceptual Templates
Research assistants and the three authors examined the acts
provided by participants. All of the examples generated by partic-
ipants for a given characteristic (e.g., all bold/assertive actions)
were examined as a single set, and in a group including the first
and third authors at WFU and a group including the second author
at SMU. The examples were discussed to identify potential action
effects that may be important to characterizing the set of actions.
For instance, examples of dependable acts typically contained
reference to commitments being fulfilled, and so the effect “fulfills
commitment to other(s),” was proposed as a potentially important
effect dimension to dependable characterizations. A large number
of effect dimensions were suggested at this stage. After all 36
characteristics were discussed, these were reduced to a smaller set
of 21 dimensions for practical purposes by eliminating those that
were deemed less relevant or sufficiently redundant with others
already included. The full list is shown in Table S2 of the Sup-
plementary Materials.
Next, the three authors developed a number of relatively simple
“provisional conceptual templates” for the 36 different action
characteristics consisting of these 21 expected effects. We found it
useful to distinguish between necessary, associated, and magnify-
ing expected effects. First, necessary expected effects were
deemed particularly central to characterizing an action in a partic-
ular way. For instance, we hypothesized that the expected effect of
“fulfilling commitments to others” was necessary to characterize
an action as dependable. Second, associated expected effects often
resulted from an action but were nonessential to its characteriza-
tion. For example, we anticipated that dependable actions would
often be “preferred by others,” but that this expected effect is not
essential (i.e., not necessary or sufficient) to characterizing an
action as dependable. Third, magnifying expected effects primarily
enhanced the relevance of other effects. For example, a particu-
1. Parcipants nominate 
acts illustrang trait-
related behavior 
2. Study team idenfies 
potenally necessary 
acon expected effect 
dimensions 
4. Study team code 
adapted items on 
dimensions to esmate 
acon expected effects 
3. Study team adapts 
nominated acons to 
shorter situaon-acon 
scenarios 
5. Parcipants rate 
adapted acons on various 
dimensions to esmate 
acon characterizaons 
6. Parcipants rate likelihood 
of performing adapted items, 
and own traits; correlated to 
esmate acon trait-
diagnoscies 
Figure 2. Flowchart of stages in the Preliminary Study and Studies 1 and 2. Stages at the same level vertically
occurred roughly contemporaneously. The Preliminary Study consisted of Stages 1 and 2; Studies 1 and 2 both






































































































960 WOOD, TOV, AND COSTELLO
larly dependable action may be one expected to “fulfill commit-
ments” especially if expected to “require great effort;” here effort
expenditure is a magnifying effect in that it augments the relevance
of fulfilling commitments.
The complete provisional templates are listed in Table S2 of the
Supplementary Materials. Although this process was somewhat
informal given that the primary role of this exercise was to aid in
generating a large number of expected effect dimensions, these
provisional conceptual templates were nonetheless useful for pro-
viding some informed hypotheses. Here, we focused solely on
whether the expected effects regarded as “necessary” elements of
a conceptual template in our discussions would be highly associ-
ated with action characterizations.
Study 1: Generating Empirically Based Templates for
Personality-Related Action Characterizations
The subset of actions nominated as illustrating conscien-
tiousness-related traits in the preliminary study were adapted into
short situation-action scenarios, which specified an action a person
might perform in a particular situation. These scenarios were rated
by two sets of participants. One group rated how much performing
the action in this situation could be described by certain charac-
teristics; the second group provided self-ratings of their personality
traits and described how likely they would be to perform these
actions. These latter ratings were used to evaluate whether actions
characterized by a certain term were more diagnostic of an indi-
vidual’s trait levels, as predicted by formative trait models (Buss &
Craik, 1983; Fleeson & Gallagher, 2009). Finally, research assis-
tants rated the extent to which the specified actions should be
expected to have certain effects on the situation described in the
scenario. This allowed us to estimate how particular action ex-
pected effect dimensions were associated with the action charac-
terizations provided by participants.
Method
Adaptation of participant-generated action scenarios. Due
to a secondary interest in exploring cross-cultural differences in
conscientiousness-related traits (Wood, Tov, & Costello, 2014),
we constructed scenarios from the acts that were nominated for
three pairs of conscientiousness-related characteristics: (a) depend-
able/reliable and undependable/unreliable, (b) disorganized/messy
and organized/neat, and (c) impulsive/spontaneous and careful/
cautious.
Several research assistants at both WFU and SMU adapted the
original actions provided by participants in the preliminary study
into shorter action scenarios. The full set of action scenarios
developed for both Studies 1 and 2 is provided in Supplementary
Table S3. Research assistants followed a standard format and set of
guidelines to adapt the original items. First, research assistants
were strongly encouraged to restrict items to 350 characters or less
to reduce overall survey length. Second, items were constructed to
generally either directly provide or strongly imply an alternative
to the target action. Third, research assistants were instructed to
create items with enough information for participants to assess the
implications of performing either the target or alternative action,
and to avoid using abstract action descriptors (e.g., assertive,
caring) in the item. Fourth, the adapted items were constructed to
retain key aspects of the original actions as much as possible.
However, some modifications were needed. Actions that were
described as habits (e.g., “he never cleans his room”) were rewrit-
ten as more specific episodes. Details that were overly specific
(e.g., “reading Robinson Crusoe for my First-Year Seminar class”)
were modified to be applicable to participants from both univer-
sities (e.g., “reading a novel for one of your classes;” Action 7 in
Table S3). Finally, when the original action referred to an “inter-
nal” experience (e.g., an emotional reaction), the action was re-
framed as an “external” behavior. For instance, one item originally
concerned feeling angry about a houseguest overstaying their
welcome; the action was reframed as the likelihood of confronting
this houseguest about the situation (Action 83 in Table S3).
This round of item generation resulted in an initial set of 196
items. Following this, the first and third authors further reduced the
set to 150 items by removing items that seemed redundant or of
lower quality given the above considerations. Slight modifications
to the remaining items were done if necessary to better fit these
considerations.
Estimating action properties.
Action characterizations. A total of 29 WFU students (70%
Female; Mage  19.2) and 37 SMU students (59% Female;
MAge  20.5) from introductory psychology participant pools
received credit toward a research participation requirement for
completing an online survey. Participants read the items generated
above and characterized the target action along a range of dimen-
sions. An example of this is shown in Figure S1 within the
Supplementary Materials (Action 69 in Table S3), which asks the
participant to imagine that they agreed to proofread a friend’s
paper, but then developed a terrible flu. After describing salient
options (to proofread the paper anyway, or to tell the friend you
can’t help because you are sick), the scenario concludes: “You still
proofread the paper.”
Participants then characterized the target action along 10 dimen-
sions spanning traits central to the Big Five and HEXACO frame-
works. For each dimension, participants rated whether the action
was best described by one characterization or an antonymous
characterization (e.g., bold/assertive vs. submissive/unassertive)
on a scale ranging from 1  very (Characteristic A), to 4  neither
(Characteristic A) or (Characteristic B) to 7  very (Characteristic
B) (see Figure S1). Subsequently, 4 was subtracted from all scores
resulting in a scale from 3 to  3, with 0 indicating that the
target action was not (or was equally) characterized by the two
terms.
To minimize participant fatigue, the 150 action scenarios were
randomly divided into three subsets of 50, and each participant
only rated one subset. To ensure data quality, ratings were elimi-
nated from subsequent analyses if their action characterizations
showed corrected item-total correlations lower than .35, as this
indicated participants were responding carelessly. For the WFU
sample, this resulted in eliminating two participants for a total of
27, or nine for each subset. For the SMU sample, this resulted in
the elimination of three participants for a total of 34, or 12 for the
first subset and 11 for the second and third).
Finally, the two samples were combined to increase the reliabil-
ity of the action characterizations. The cross-sample correlations
were quite high (r’s ranged from .74 for bold/assertive to .94 for
careful/cautious; Mr  .85), suggesting that action characteriza-






































































































961CHARACTERIZING ACTIONS BY THEIR EXPECTED EFFECTS
consulted to identify more specifically the action scenarios char-
acterized as highest and lowest on each dimension.
Trait-diagnosticities. To estimate the extent to which each
action was diagnostic of different personality traits, 115 WFU
students (56% female, Mage  19.1) and 108 SMU students
(68.5% female, Mage  21.1) from introductory psychology par-
ticipant pools completed a different version of the survey. Analy-
ses are conducted by combining these samples.
Each participant completed the Inventory of Individual Differ-
ences in the Lexicon (IIDL; Wood et al., 2010), and a number of
conscientiousness-related adjectives (Roberts, Bogg, Walton,
Chernyshenko, & Stark, 2004). Next, participants rated all 150
scenarios on a single item of “How likely would you be to [target
action]?” For instance, in the example given in Figure S1, partic-
ipants were asked “How likely would you be to still proofread the
paper?,” with likelihood ratings ranging from 1  less than 10%
chance to 5  more than a 90% chance.
The self-rated personality items that participants provided to
estimate the trait-diagnosticities were not identical to bipolar rat-
ings used to estimate action characterizations. To make them more
parallel, we combined a number of self-ratings; these are shown in
the Appendix. The trait-diagnosticity of each action was estimated
by correlating participants’ reported likelihood of performing the
action with their self-ratings of a specific trait. For instance, an
estimated .13 “intelligent trait-diagnosticity” for the item pro-
vided in Figure S1 indicated that higher endorsement of this item
was diagnostic of slightly lower smart/intelligent self-ratings.
Prior to any analyses, several participants were removed using
indications that they completed some or all of the survey ran-
domly. First, we removed participants that completed the survey in
less than 20 min (N  21 WFU and 15 SMU participants). Next,
we removed participants that met two of the following criteria: (a)
completed the survey in less than 30 min, (b) had below r  .20
correspondence with the normative response profile to the scenar-
ios, or (c) had below r  .20 correspondence with the normative
response profile to the IIDL (N  7 WFU and 2 SMU partici-
pants). Finally, we removed participants that met all of the fol-
lowing criteria: (a) completed the survey in less than 35 min, (b)
had below r  .30 correspondence with the normative profile of
responses to the scenarios, and (c) had below r  .30 correspon-
dence with the normative profile of responses to the IIDL (N  1
WFU and 1 SMU participant).2 The final sample consisted of 176
participants (WFU N  86; SMU N  90).
Expected effects. Eleven research assistants coded the 150
action scenarios along the 21 expected effect dimensions generated
from the preliminary study. For each item, raters were prompted
“How much would doing this (vs. the alternative) alter the poten-
tial/possibility of the following outcomes?” and rated the action
along each dimension on a scale from 1  greatly increase to 3 
no expected change to 5  greatly decrease. In subsequent anal-
yses, 3 was subtracted from all scores resulting in a 2 to  2
scale, and scores were then reversed such that higher scores were
associated with greater expected effects on the indicated dimen-
sions.
Research assistants were instructed to focus on how the depicted
action changes the situation relative to the most salient alternative
action that could be performed. The latter was usually indicated
explicitly in the scenario. Additionally, raters were told that often,
the likelihood of seemingly opposed effects could be simultane-
ously increased (or decreased) by the same action, with the exam-
ple “approaching someone at a bar increases the potential or
possibility of both being rejected and being connected/related to
another person” relative to not approaching the person. Table S3
can be consulted to identify more specifically how raters described
the expected effects of each action scenario.
Results and Discussion
In all of the analyses that follow, the situation–action scenarios
(N  150) serve as the unit of analysis.
Reliabilities and variabilities of action characterizations.
We first examined the reliability and range of scenarios along the
10 characterization dimensions; see Table 3. The correlation be-
tween a characterization’s reliability (averaged across the three
sets) and its standard deviation was .86. The dimensions with both
the greatest variability and reliability were conscientiousness-
related terms (industrious, organized, careful, dependable).3 In
contrast, both the lowest alphas and variabilities were associated
with confident and bold action characterizations.
Relations between action characterizations and
trait-diagnosticities. In the final two columns of Table 3, we
show the reliability of trait-diagnosticities, and the extent to which
actions characterized by a given term tended to be diagnostic of
individual differences in the same characteristic at the person level.
The reliability column TD estimates the expected reliability of the
ordering of trait-diagnosticity correlations (Sherman & Wood,
2014). Trait-diagnosticities were estimated to be more reliable for
conscientiousness-related terms (TD’s from .57 to .78) than for
the remaining terms (TD’s from .13 to .53).
As shown in Table 3, the level of correspondence between an
action’s characterization and its trait-diagnosticity was invariably
positive, but varied widely across the 10 characteristics examined,
ranging from a low of r  .22 for confident action characteriza-
tions to a high of r  .76 for organized action characterizations.
Again, the four conscientiousness-related characterizations had the
greatest cross-method correspondence. Overall, however, these
analyses suggest that for all dimensions, actions described by a
given trait term were more likely to be performed by individuals
who described themselves by the same term (e.g., actions charac-
terized as assertive were more diagnostic of assertiveness).
Relations between action properties.
Relations between action characterizations. We next ex-
plored associations among the 10 action characterizations. To
better organize the dimensions, we conducted an exploratory factor
analysis using principle axis factoring and varimax rotation. Re-
sults suggested a three-factor solution provided a satisfactory
organizing framework. First, actions tended to be characterized
similarly in the extent to which they were industrious, organized,
careful, dependable, and intelligent (all pairwise rs between .63
and .84; Table 4). Second, actions tended to be characterized
2 Supporting the use of response normativeness as an indicator of ran-
dom responding, response time (after a log transformation) was correlated
r  .21 and .13 with scenario normativeness and IIDL normativeness,
respectively. In Study 2, these correlations were r  .37 and .15.
3 For brevity and readability, the longer labels presented to participants
for the action characterizations (e.g., “dependable, reliable vs. undepend-
able, unreliable”) are generally shown in the text by presenting just the first






































































































962 WOOD, TOV, AND COSTELLO
similarly in the extent to which they were kind-hearted, truthful,
dependable, and intelligent (all pairwise rs between .32 and .75).
Third, actions were characterized similarly in the extent to which
they were confident, bold, and outgoing (rs between .37 and .83).
Some of the ways in which these characterizations were asso-
ciated can be appreciated by referring to Table S3. For instance,
one scenario (16) concerned agreeing to meet a friend over the
weekend despite knowing that you will have to cancel later be-
cause of other commitments. This action was simultaneously char-
acterized as the single most unfriendly, untruthful, and afraid
action in the 150 item set, and nearly the most undependable. Such
examples illustrate that a single action was regularly characterized
by several distinct terms simultaneously.
Relations between expected effect dimensions. Basic descrip-
tive properties of the 21 expected effect dimensions are given in
Table 5. Reliabilities ranged from   .66 to .93 (M  .85),
indicating that the ordering of the 150 scenarios was highly reli-
able for all dimensions.
The relations between the expected effect dimensions are shown
in Table 6. To better organize the 21 effects examined, we con-
ducted a hierarchical cluster analysis using the average (within-
group) linkage clustering algorithm and correlations as the index
of similarity; the analysis included both the items and their rever-
sals to allow negatively correlated effects to be placed on the same
cluster (Wood et al., 2010). This suggested that the 21 measured
effects could be roughly organized in four larger clusters.
Interestingly, each of the three largest clusters seemed to
indicate that within this action set, “positive” effects of an
action were often positively correlated with other “negative”
effects. For instance, within the first cluster (rows 1–10 in
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Action Characterizations (Studies 1 and 2)
Action characterizations M SD Min Max 1 2 3 TD r(C, TD)
Study 1: Conscientiousness-related scenarios
1. Industrious/Hard-working (vs. Lazy/Unproductive) .72 1.06 2.25 2.85 .96 .97 .96 .62 .69
2. Organized/Neat (vs. Disorganized/Messy) .77 1.24 2.05 2.82 .97 .96 .98 .78 .76
3. Careful/Cautious (vs. Impulsive/Spontaneous) .18 1.42 2.75 2.65 .98 .97 .97 .57 .74
4. Dependable/Reliable (vs. Undependable/Unreliable) .86 1.28 2.50 2.86 .97 .97 .97 .58 .53
5. Intelligent/Smart (vs. Unintelligent/Foolish) .35 .90 1.80 2.05 .94 .94 .93 .53 .26
6. Kind-hearted/Caring (vs. Unfriendly/Cold) .59 .89 1.60 2.84 .96 .94 .96 .49 .42
7. Truthful/Honest (vs. Untruthful/Dishonest) .45 .71 2.33 2.70 .93 .90 .94 .52 .24
8. Confident/Self-assured (vs. Afraid/Scared) .58 .64 .81 2.50 .83 .79 .92 .35 .22
9. Bold/Assertive (vs. Submissive/Unassertive) .58 .67 .85 2.47 .82 .88 .93 .31 .41
10. Outgoing/Sociable (vs. Bashful/Shy) .58 .64 .24 2.85 .91 .83 .95 .13 .40
Study 2: Scenarios from remaining HEXACO domains
1. Industrious/Hard-working (vs. Lazy/Unproductive) .35 .81 2.11 2.72 .89 .94 .94 .57 .44
2. Organized/Neat (vs. Disorganized/Messy) .19 .53 1.90 1.89 .79 .88 .87 .41 .35
3. Careful/Cautious (vs. Impulsive/Spontaneous) .32 1.21 2.89 2.28 .94 .95 .96 .63 .65
4. Dependable/Reliable (vs. Undependable/Unreliable) .45 1.12 2.70 2.80 .98 .95 .92 .69 .62
5. Intelligent/Smart (vs. Unintelligent/Foolish) .24 .90 2.22 2.39 .92 .92 .94 .59 .64
6. Kind-hearted/Caring (vs. Unfriendly/Cold) .41 1.27 2.67 2.80 .98 .96 .95 .64 .66
7. Truthful/Honest (vs. Untruthful/Dishonest) .62 1.04 2.50 2.80 .97 .95 .93 .59 .39
8. Confident/Self-assured (vs. Afraid/Scared) .91 1.18 2.17 2.67 .92 .97 .96 .52 .65
9. Bold/Assertive (vs. Submissive/Unassertive) .87 1.24 2.50 2.72 .93 .96 .96 .61 .71
10. Outgoing/Sociable (vs. Bashful/Shy) .75 1.08 2.28 2.72 .94 .97 .96 .65 .72
Note. 1, 2, and 3 indicate reliabilities of the first, second, and third subsets. Column TD indicates the reliability of the trait-diagnosticity estimates;
r(C, TD) indicates the relationship between an action’s characterization and trait-diagnosticity on the corresponding dimension. All r(C, TD) correlations
are significant (p 	 .05).
Table 4
Relationships Between Action Characterizations (Studies 1 and 2)
Action characterizations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Industrious/Hard-working (vs. Lazy/Unproductive) — .78 .12 .55 .72 .27 .41 .44 .40 .26
2 Organized/Neat (vs. Disorganized/Messy) .84 — .33 .57 .72 .32 .42 .30 .26 .18
3 Careful/Cautious (vs. Impulsive/Spontaneous) .70 .72 — .30 .45 .23 .02 .56 .56 .55
4 Dependable/Reliable (vs. Undependable/Unreliable) .73 .63 .69 — .66 .81 .59 .30 .14 .32
5 Intelligent/Smart (vs. Unintelligent/Foolish) .77 .71 .87 .70 — .50 .50 .34 .24 .24
6 Kind-hearted/Caring (vs. Unfriendly/Cold) .28 .17 .34 .75 .32 — .34 .23 .03 .43
7 Truthful/Honest (vs. Untruthful/Dishonest) .30 .23 .37 .54 .48 .38 — .51 .51 .36
8 Confident/Self-assured (vs. Afraid/Scared) .13 .22 .43 .08 .10 .03 .26 — .87 .82
9 Bold/Assertive (vs. Submissive/Unassertive) .11 .19 .34 .15 .04 .21 .34 .83 — .69
10 Outgoing/Sociable (vs. Bashful/Shy) .24 .32 .31 .09 .11 .37 .21 .57 .37 —
Note. N  150 scenarios in Study 1 and 149 in Study 2. All |rs|  .40 shown in bold, all |rs|  .17 are statistically significant (ps 	 .05). Correlations






































































































963CHARACTERIZING ACTIONS BY THEIR EXPECTED EFFECTS
Tables 5–7), actions expected to better express one’s desires
were expected to conflict with others’ preferences and increase
risk of negative interpersonal consequences; and actions ex-
pected to better advance others’ preferences and fulfill commit-
ments were expected to increase effort expenditure. Within the
second cluster (rows 11–14), actions expected to increase status
and connection to others were expected to result in more work
in the future. In the third cluster (rows 15–19), actions expected
to increase environmental predictability and order were ex-
pected to result in greater effort expenditure and less exposure
to social and stimulating environments.
Relations between action characterizations and expected
effects. Finally, we explored the relationships between the 10
action characterizations and action expected effects; these are
shown in Table 7. Below we discuss each characterization, partic-
ularly noting expected effects dimensions that correlated above
|r|  .60 with the characterization, and additional expected effects
that correlated above |r|  .40. Although |rs| as low as .17 were
statistically significant, we limited our interpretations to a thresh-
old of .40 as this has been offered as a convention for a “moderate”
to “high” association (Cohen, 1988). We felt this was an appro-
priate minimum association to expect for dimensions which are
“necessary” elements of a characteristic’s conceptual template.
Industrious/hardworking. Actions were particularly likely
(i.e., |rs|  .60) to be characterized as industrious if they were
expected to increase effort expenditure (Feature 8; Table 7), ad-
vance career goals (18), increase environmental order (15) and
predictability (16). Furthermore, such characterizations tended to
be associated (i.e., |rs| between .40 and .59) with expected in-
creases in social status (11), fulfillment of commitments (2), and
decreases in social rejection (3) and future commitments in others
(9).
Organized/neat. Actions were particularly likely to be char-
acterized as organized if they were expected to increase environ-
mental order (16), predictability (15), and effort expenditure (8).
Further more, such characterizations were associated with actions
expected to advance achievement goals (18), and decrease both
future commitments (14) and social rejection (3).
Careful/cautious. Actions were particularly likely to be charac-
terized as careful if they were expected to increase environmental
predictability (15) and order (16), and decrease surprise in others (5)
and sensory/physical excitement (17). Furthermore, such character-
izations tended to be associated with actions expected to increase
effort expenditure (8), match to others’ preferences (1) and fulfillment
of commitments (2), and decrease social rejection (3), attention to self
(6), and harm in oneself or others (20–21).
Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for Action Expected Effects (Studies 1 and 2)
Study 1: Consc-related traits Study 2: Other HEXACO traits
# Action expected effects M SD Min Max  M SD Min Max 
1 Doing what other(s) would prefer you to do .28 .78 1.43 1.57 .91 .06 .91 1.78 1.67 .93
2 Fulfilling your commitments to other(s) .22 .74 1.71 1.86 .66 .12 .52 1.56 1.44 .84
3 Experiencing rejection, negative interpersonal
consequences
.01 .56 1.29 1.71 .93 .28 .62 1.00 1.56 .83
4 Someone else experiencing rejection, negative
interpersonal consequences
.04 .41 1.29 1.29 .78 .13 .78 1.33 1.78 .90
5 Acting in way unexpected/surprising to others .23 .51 1.14 1.57 .86 .33 .53 1.00 1.89 .81
6 Drawing attention of others to yourself .30 .43 .57 1.71 .83 .49 .75 1.38 2.00 .92
7 Expressing/enacting your own wants, desires,
values
.33 .52 1.14 1.71 .87 .53 .76 1.33 1.56 .88
8 Effort expended (to perform the action) .77 .61 1.43 1.71 .79 .51 .72 1.33 1.67 .88
9 Someone else having commitments, work to
do in the future
.01 .42 1.43 1.43 .92 .06 .36 .89 1.78 .80
10 Learn new things, acquire new knowledge/
information
.18 .31 .71 1.43 .86 .17 .52 1.22 1.89 .88
11 Gaining social status (e.g.,
rank/power/prestige/popularity)
.10 .32 1.00 1.00 .88 .09 .52 1.11 1.56 .85
12 Be more related/connected to other(s) .23 .50 1.29 1.57 .83 .20 .83 1.67 1.67 .93
13 Being exposed to social situations .28 .42 1.43 1.71 .93 .33 .64 1.67 1.78 .89
14 Having commitments, work to do in the
future
.03 .57 1.29 1.71 .90 .25 .47 1.33 1.67 .82
15 Being in a predictable situation .01 .72 1.57 1.71 .88 .23 .62 1.56 1.33 .84
16 Having order/structure in environment .32 .75 1.57 1.86 .85 .01 .50 1.56 1.11 .79
17 Experiencing sensory/physical stimulation/
activity/excitement
.25 .39 .86 1.57 .82 .25 .51 1.33 1.44 .86
18 Meeting career/academic/achievement goals .15 .60 1.43 1.71 .85 .06 .50 1.78 1.67 .93
19 Providing accurate information about what
you know, or truly feel/believe
.12 .30 .86 1.43 .90 .36 .65 1.50 1.67 .87
20 Experiencing physical harm/pain .08 .34 1.29 2.00 .81 .03 .27 1.33 1.67 .89
21 Someone else experiencing physical harm/
pain
.00 .32 1.57 1.14 .86 .03 .17 1.11 .44 .69
Note. Consc-related  conscientiousness-related traits. N  150 scenarios in Study 1 and 149 in Study 2. Alphas (s) based on 11 raters in Study 1, and




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































966 WOOD, TOV, AND COSTELLO
Dependable/reliable. Actions were particularly likely to be
characterized as dependable if they were expected to fulfill com-
mitments (2), match others’ preferences (1), expend effort (8), and
decrease social rejection (3). Furthermore, such characterizations
tended to be associated with actions expected to increase environ-
mental predictability (15) and order (18), status (11), relations to
others (12), and decrease surprise in others (5), work for others to
do (9), and rejection felt by others (4).
Intelligent/smart. Actions were particularly likely to be char-
acterized as intelligent if they were expected to increase environ-
mental predictability (15), and the attainment of achievement goals
(18). Furthermore, such characterizations tended to be associated
with actions expected to increase environmental order (16), effort
expenditure (8), fulfillment of commitments (2), provision of
accurate information (19), matching others’ preferences (1), ac-
quisition of new knowledge (10), and status (11), and decrease
surprise in others (5), social rejection (3), harm/pain (20), and
sensory excitement (17).
Kind-hearted/caring. Actions were particularly likely to be
characterized as kind-hearted if they were expected to do what
others would prefer (1), increase relatedness to others (12), fulfill
commitments (2), and decrease social rejection of oneself and
others (3, 4). Furthermore, such characterizations tended to be
associated with actions expected to increase social status (11) and
effort expenditure (8), and decrease expression of one’s desires (7)
and surprise in others (5).
Truthful/honest. Actions were particularly likely to be char-
acterized as truthful if they were expected to express information
that accurately reflected one’s feelings/beliefs (19). Furthermore,
such characterizations tended to be associated with actions ex-
pected to fulfill commitments (2).
Confident/self-assured. Actions were particularly likely to be
characterized as confident if they were expected to increase atten-
tion to oneself (6). Furthermore, such characterizations tended to
be associated with actions expected to increase sensory/physical
stimulation (17), expression of one’s values or desires (7), surprise
in others (5), and social rejection (3), while decreasing environ-
mental predictability (15).
Bold/assertive. Actions were particularly likely to be charac-
terized as bold if they were expected to increase attention to
oneself (6) and expression of one’s desires (7). Furthermore, such
characterizations tended to be associated with actions expected to
increase social rejection (3) and surprise in others (5).
Outgoing/sociable. Actions were particularly likely to be
characterized as outgoing if expected to increase exposure to social
situations (13) and relatedness to others (12). Furthermore, such
characterizations tended to be associated with actions expected to
increase experience of sensory/physical stimulation (17), and en-
vironmental predictability and order (15, 16).
Other themes regarding action characterization-expected
effect relationships.
Correspondence to prestudy predictions. There was also con-
siderable correspondence between the observed action chara-
cterization-expected effect associations and the prestudy provi-
sional predictions shown in Table S2. In Table 7, we indicated the
14 effects ventured as potentially “necessary” to characterizing an
action by a particular term by italicizing these cells. In all cases the
predicted association was significant in the expected direction (all
|rs|  .28); and in 11 of the 14 cases, the strength of the association
exceeded |r|  .60.
“Mixed” templates. An interesting finding that can be seen
in Table 7 is that most action characterizations were associated
with a blend of positive and negative expected effects. For
instance, actions tended to be characterized by communal terms
(e.g., dependable, kind) if expected to match others’ prefer-
ences (1), but also if expected to increase effort expenditure (8)
and decrease expression of one’s desires (7). Similarly, actions
tended to be characterized by agentic terms (e.g., bold, confi-
dent) if expected to increase expression of one’s desires (7), but
also if expected to increase the likelihood of physical harm (20)
and social rejection (3).
Study 2: Replication in a Broader Set of Stimuli
In Study 1, we found that an action’s characterizations could be
very strongly predicted by how the action was expected to alter the
situation. Additionally, the expected effect dimensions that were
associated with action characterizations tended to show strong
correspondence with provisional prestudy hypotheses. We also
found that action characterizations tended to be highly diagnostic
of analogous trait perceptions at the person level.
There were nonetheless important limitations of the first study.
Perhaps the most important was that the set of actions were
selected entirely from actions nominated as conscientiousness-
related behaviors. The consequences of this were visible in various
ways. As shown in Table 3, the four conscientiousness-related
characterizations showed greater levels of variability across the
scenarios, higher reliabilities, and greater trait diagnosticities than
the remaining six characterizations. This may have influenced
other features of Study 1, such as the covariation of action ex-
pected effect dimensions, and relations between an action’s ex-
pected effects and characterizations. Consequently, it is thus pos-
sible that these relationships could change substantially with a
sampling of scenarios drawn from a wider range of traits.
The principle aim of Study 2 was to expand the sampling of
scenarios to a more diverse set of traits. To make the set as distinct
as possible from Study 1, we adapted illustrative actions for all
HEXACO dimensions except conscientiousness. These were taken
from the preliminary study described earlier. We then replicated
most of the analyses conducted in Study 1.
We anticipated that many expected effect dimensions which
were highly associated with action characterizations in Study 1
were not necessary components of the characterization’s concep-
tual template, but rather were associated due to covarying with
these components within the Study 1 action set. For instance,
actions which increased expected rejection tended to be character-
ized as less industrious (r  .47); however, this may have been
because these actions tended to decrease effort expenditure
(r  .50), and thus could have covaried with industrious char-
acterizations due to covarying with this more necessary feature. An
advantage of using a new action set—particularly one constructed
from a different population of stimuli—is that features which are
not necessary components of a term’s conceptual template might
be revealed as correlations which fail to replicate in Study 2. In
contrast, expected effect dimensions which are truly necessary
components of the conceptual template should remain highly cor-






































































































967CHARACTERIZING ACTIONS BY THEIR EXPECTED EFFECTS
use of a distinct scenario set should help clarify the nature of the
conceptual templates associated with important action character-
izations.
Method
Generation of action set. Items were created from the same
set of scenarios generated in the preliminary study, but this time
using scenarios generated for the 15 bipolar non-
conscientiousness-related trait pairs listed in Table S1. Scenarios
were adapted in the same manner as Study 1, with the exception
that all scenarios came from the WFU sample and were adapted by
research assistants at WFU. The first and third author again final-
ized items after this first round of adaptation by research assistants.
Five scenarios were selected for each end of the 15 bipolar dimen-
sions. The resulting 150 scenarios are listed in Table S3 (scenarios
151–300). Due to an error at the data collection phase, all ratings
for one scenario (266) were not collected, resulting in 149 scenar-
ios available for analyses.
Action properties.
Action characterizations. A total of 60 WFU undergraduates
(75% female; Mage  18.8) characterized the actions, again rating
only one subset of 50 actions; due to a missing item, the third
subset consisted of 49 scenarios. Instructions and rating scales
were the same as in Study 1. Participants were excluded using the
same criteria as in Study 1, resulting in two exclusions: zero from
the first subset, one from the second, and one from the third. This
resulted in a final sample 20, 20, and 18 participants rating the
first, second, and third subsets, respectively.
Trait diagnosticities. A total of 258 WFU undergraduates (58%
female; Mage  18.8) rated their likelihood of performing the 150
actions as in Study 1. We excluded 41 participants using the same
criteria as Study 1, yielding a final sample of 217 participants.
Participants completed the IIDL, and seven additional items
which consisted of any pole of the 10 bipolar action characteriza-
tions dimensions which were not included in the IIDL, as shown in
Table 3. This allowed us to compute trait diagnosticities that more
directly paralleled the action characterization items than was pos-
sible in Study 1.
Expected effects. A total of 10 research assistants rated each
action’s expected effects on the same 21 dimensions, using the
same instructions and scales as in Study 1.
Results and Discussion
Reliabilities and variabilities of action properties. As ex-
pected, the use of nonconscientiousness scenarios resulted in less
variability in the extent to which actions were characterized by
conscientiousness-related terms (industrious, organized, careful, de-
pendable) than found in Study 1, and more variability in the extent to
which the actions were characterized by almost all other terms (kind-
hearted, truthful, confident, bold, outgoing; Table 3). There was a
particularly truncated range in the extent to which actions were
characterized as organized (SD  .52; all others between .80 and
1.27). The ordering of action characterizations was highly reliable for
all dimensions (all s  .79).
Relations between action characterizations and
trait-diagnosticities. As shown in Table 3, reliabilities of trait-
diagnosticities ranged from .41 for organization to .69 for depend-
ability. Further more, actions characterized by certain trait terms
again tended to be more diagnostic of individual differences in
self-reported levels of these terms. Associations between corre-
sponding action characterizations and trait-diagnosticities were
invariably positive and at least moderate in magnitude, ranging
from r  .35 for actions characterized as organized and .72 for
actions characterized as sociable. Associations were much larger
for nonconscientiousness related characterizations in Study 2 than
Study 1 (Mr  .62 vs. .33), whereas they were somewhat smaller
for conscientiousness-related characterizations (Mr  .52 vs. .68).
These findings thus replicate Study 1 in showing that actions
characterized by a particular term are typically more diagnostic of
individual differences in the corresponding trait.
Relations between action properties.
Relations among action characterizations. The relations
among the 10 action characterizations largely paralleled those
observed in Study 1. The correlation between the action charac-
terization correlation matrices observed in Studies 1 and 2 (the
top-right and bottom-left halves of Table 4) was .70, indicating
that the pattern of associations was fairly stationary. However,
there were some sizable shifts. For instance, actions that were
characterized as careful were substantially less likely to be char-
acterized as industrious, organized, dependable, and intelligent
and truthful in Study 2 than in Study 1 (
rs .34 to .58).
Similarly, actions that were characterized as confident, bold, and
outgoing were substantially more likely to be characterized as
industrious, organized, dependable, and intelligent in Study 2 than
in Study 1 (
rs .23 to .57).
Relations among action expected effects. The relations
among the 21 expected effects dimensions also largely paralleled
those observed in Study 1. The correlation between the correlation
matrices observed in Studies 1 and 2 (the top-right and bottom-left
halves of Table 6) was .81, indicating that the pattern of associations was
fairly stationary. However there some sizable shifts. Interestingly,
only 26 of the 210 pairs of correlations differed by |
r|  .30
across the two studies, but 11 of these involved effort expenditure
(Feature 8 in Table 6). Expected effort expenditure was much more
positively associated with expectations of rejection, surprising
others, drawing attention to oneself, expressing one’s desires,
being exposed to social situations, having commitments, and ex-
periencing excitement in Study 2 (all 
rs  .51) and much less
positively associated with expected environmental predictability
and order (all 
rs  .82).
Consistent relations between action expected effects and
characterizations across studies. As shown at the bottom of
Table 7, the consistency in how the 10 action characterizations
were associated with the 21 expected effect dimensions across
studies, estimated by column-vector correlations, ranged from high
to near unity (rs between .61 and .97, Mr  .81). However, as
expected, there were nonetheless many differences in action
characterization-expected effect associations across studies. We
continue by reporting only characterization-expected effect asso-
ciations which were above a |r|  .40 magnitude in both studies, as
these are the most likely to be necessary components of the
characterization’s conceptual template. We report these in decreas-
ing order of magnitude averaged across studies.
Industrious/hardworking. Actions expected to meet achieve-
ment goals (18 in Table 7) and expend effort (8) were substantially






































































































968 WOOD, TOV, AND COSTELLO
In contrast, whereas an action’s expected effects on increasing
environmental order (16) and predictability (15), status (11), and
commitment fulfillment (2), and on decreasing rejection (3) and
work for others (9) were associated with industrious action char-
acterizations above the |r|  .40 threshold in Study 1, they were
not in Study 2. This suggests that these effect dimensions were less
important or necessary elements of the conceptual template for
industrious action characterizations than suggested in Study 1.
Organized/neat. In both studies, actions expected to advance
achievement goals (18) were substantially more likely to be char-
acterized as organized in both studies. No other effects were
consistently associated above a .40 magnitude, likely in part due to
the restriction of range in organized actions in this set (see Table
3).
Careful/cautious. Actions expected to increase the environ-
ment’s predictability (15) and order (16), and to decrease sensory
pleasure (17), surprise in others (5), rejection (3), and attention to
oneself (6) were substantially more likely to be characterized as
careful in both studies.
Dependable/reliable. Actions expected to increase fulfillment
of obligations (2) and of others’ preferences (1), effort expenditure
(8), social status (11), and relatedness to others (12), and to
decrease rejection of others (4) were substantially more likely to be
characterized as dependable in both studies.
Intelligent/smart. Actions expected to increase attainment of
achievement goals (18), environmental order (16), fulfillment of
commitments (2), and knowledge acquisition (10) were substan-
tially more likely to be characterized as intelligent in both studies.
Kind-hearted/caring. Actions expected to increase fulfillment
of others’ preferences (1), relatedness to others (12), fulfillment of
commitments (2), social status (11), and effort expenditure (8), and
to decrease the likelihood of someone else or oneself experiencing
rejection (4 and 3) were substantially more likely to be character-
ized as kind-hearted in both studies.
Truthful/honest. Only the expected effect of having provided
accurate information about one’s knowledge, beliefs, or feelings
(11) was consistently highly associated with truthful characteriza-
tions across both studies.
Confident/self-assured. Actions expected to increase atten-
tion to oneself (6), sensory excitement (17), expression of one’s
desires (7), and social rejection (3), and to decrease environmental
predictability (15) were substantially more likely to be character-
ized as confident in both studies.
Bold/assertive. Actions expected to increase expression of
one’s desires (7), attention to oneself (6), social rejection (3),
expression of one’s beliefs or feelings (3), and surprise in others
(5) were substantially more likely to be characterized as bold in
both studies.
Outgoing/sociable. Actions expected to increase exposure to
social situations (13), relatedness to others (55), sensory excite-
ment (17), and to decrease environmental predictability (15) and
order (16) were substantially more likely to be characterized as
outgoing in both studies.
Summary
To the extent that there was heterogeneity in the associations
between an action’s expected effects and its characterizations
across studies, the results seemed consistent with the prediction
that expected effects dimensions that were necessary for charac-
terizing an action by a particular term stayed highly associated in
both studies. For instance, industrious characterizations showed a
fair level of heterogeneity in how they were associated with
expected effect dimensions across studies—with five of the 21
expected effects differing by more than |
r|  .40 in magnitude—
but the two expected effect dimensions most highly associated
with industrious characterizations in Study 1 (8: effort expendi-
ture, and #18: meeting career goals) remained the two most high
associated dimensions in Study 2. Additionally, nine of the 13
effects provisionally hypothesized as “necessary” components of a
characterization’s conceptual template were associated above a
|r|  .60 magnitude in the expected direction in both studies.
General Discussion
This work was initiated to address a limitation with trait models
that regard personality descriptors as summaries or expected like-
lihoods of certain actions (e.g., Buss & Craik, 1983; Fleeson &
Gallagher, 2009; Wiggins, 1997). Specifically, if individuals’ trait
levels are formed by their expected rate of trait-identifying actions,
what makes an action trait-identifying? Results from two studies
indicate that we can very effectively predict how an action will be
characterized from its expected effects. Furthermore, relationships
between action characterizations and expected effects were highly
consistent across studies and corresponded with prespecified pre-
dictions. This supports the view that action characterizations are
applied when an action’s expected effects fit relatively invariant
conceptual templates. These findings advance the broader goal of
determining how personality-relevant action concepts can be for-
mally represented by high-level abstract features (Heider, 1958;
Holmes, 2004; Kelley, 1997).
Limitations and Future Directions
Refining the templates. The expected effect dimensions that
were consistently related to action characterizations across studies,
as shown in Table 7, provide good first approximations of the
characterizations’ conceptual templates. As an interesting exam-
ple, cooperative actions have previously been described in game
theoretical and economic frameworks as actions which are ex-
pected to benefit others but come at costs to the actor (Nowak,
2006). Although specifically cooperative action characterizations
were not examined here, it is instructive that in both studies
dependable and kind characterizations were more highly ascribed
to actions likely to do what others prefer (Feature #1 in Table 6)
and to expend effort (Feature #8). The similarity between the
empirically identified templates for these concepts and the work-
ing definitions of similar concepts in game theoretical frameworks
bolsters our confidence that “revealed preference” methodologies
(Hitsch et al., 2010; Samuelson, 1948) can be applied to illuminate
the nature of concepts. Nevertheless, these should be regarded as
“drafts” which can be improved by various routes. We consider
some of these below.
Inclusion of additional effect dimensions. First, we limited
our analysis to 21 expected effect dimensions on the basis of
practical considerations. As a result, some dimensions that may be
fairly central to the characterizations examined in the current study






































































































969CHARACTERIZING ACTIONS BY THEIR EXPECTED EFFECTS
“provided a high quality solution to a problem” is a somewhat
distinct effect dimension from “advanced achievement goals” (and
likely is often why this latter effect occurs), and this may be
particularly important to intelligent action characterizations. Cer-
tainly, as more action characterizations are explored (e.g., control-
ling, stingy, humble), additional effect dimensions will need to be
added.
The list of important effect dimensions for characterizing ac-
tions might be expanded by considering unique features found
within major situational frameworks (Kelley et al., 2003; Rauth-
mann et al., 2014; Sherman, Nave, & Funder, 2010), or within
values and motivational frameworks (Murray, 1938; Schwartz,
1992). A small sampling of features that play an important role in
other frameworks include the presence of sexual opportunities
(Kenrick, Griskevicius, Neuberg, & Schaller, 2010; Rauthmann et
al., 2014), distinctions between the effects of one’s actions on
in-group members, out-group members, and strangers (Bugental,
2000; Reis, 2008), and distinctions between the effects of one’s
actions in the short-term and in the long-run (e.g., doing a chore
could take more effort now but save more effort later).
Breaking the empirically estimated templates. As noted pre-
viously, the empirically estimated templates which serve as the
central results of the study are likely to contain some elements that
are necessary to characterizing an action by a given term, and
others that are merely associated due to covarying with these
elements. As one example, actions that had the expected effect of
“gaining status” tended to be characterized as kind in both Studies
1 and 2 (rs  .59 and .60, respectively). However, we imagine that
this is not what makes an action kind. Rather, it is likely associated
(as any good elected politician knows) because social status is
frequently afforded to individuals who advance the interests of
others (i.e., who do kind actions). To explore whether particular
features are necessary components of a conceptual template, future
research may subject such features to a “stress test” of sorts: seeing
whether perceivers continue to characterize actions expected to
have particular effects by the term even as other potentially nec-
essary effects are expected to decrease.
Beyond expected effects. Although we have argued that an
action’s expected effects are central to its characterizations, other
action properties likely serve important roles. Two may be of
particular interest to explore in future research.
First, numerous characterizations may hinge on an action’s
actual effects, regardless of whether the effects were expected or
not. For instance, we might regard George Kirk’s actions as helpful
and intelligent before knowing their results, but then discount these
characterizations if they ultimately failed to save anyone. This
could be explored empirically by seeing how action characteriza-
tions change before and after specifying the ultimate outcomes of
an action, which was not done in these scenarios.
Second, it seems likely that actions are characterized to a con-
siderable degree by their intended effects (Malle, 1999; Read,
Druian, & Miller, 1989). For instance, two individuals may per-
form nominally the same action in the same situation, but with
different motivations. Perhaps the first helped someone in order to
make the person happy, whereas the second did so in order to curry
favor or foster a positive reputation. It is easy to imagine that the
second action might be less likely characterized as caring and
more likely characterized as calculating or manipulative. This can
be explored by specifying the effects that actors were striving to
attain by their actions.
Deepening connections to decision-making models. As
noted earlier, a signature of expected effects is that a given action
can increase the likelihood of both increasing and decreasing on a
single dimension (e.g., wealth, interpersonal relations). Our raters
sensibly coded actions as having these sorts of expected effects.
For instance, our raters coded the actions of running for Student
Government President (Action #247), asking a friend out for a date
(210), and sharing an embarrassing story with a new friend (142)
as simultaneously increasing the expected likelihood of experienc-
ing rejection and of being connected to others (Features #3 and
#12; see Table S3). As shown in Table S1, these three actions were
also described as moderately to highly confident and bold by our
participants. We believe these expected effects may be singularly
important for understanding these characterizations: The fact that
rejection could occur by doing these actions was likely an impor-
tant reason perceivers characterized them as confident and bold.
It is nonetheless useful to recall the large number of steps that
must be taken to formally estimate an action’s expected effects, as
done with the example of George Kirk in Table 2. To do this, we
must (a) make reasonable representations of the actions the actor
has available; (b) make reasonable representations of the possible
outcome situations that might result from these actions, and of
their probabilities; (c) represent levels of more specific features of
these outcome situations; (d) use these values to calculate an
action’s “expected outcomes;” and (e) take the difference between
the action’s expected outcomes and some counterfactual action.
Although the process we have described has strong parallels to
major frameworks for representing decision-making (e.g., Alm-
lund et al., 2011; Gintis, 2009; Krantz & Kunreuther, 2007),
perceivers almost certainly simplify this more complete chain of
steps to characterize most actions. Connecting this framework to
others which more centrally emphasize the costs and constraints on
information processing (Anderson, 1990; Kahneman, 2011; Todd
& Gigerenzer, 2012), would help to better understand how perceiv-
ers do this. For instance, perceivers could compare the expected
outcomes of an action with the initial situation that existed before the
action was perceived (rather than generate a set of counterfactual
actions) to quickly estimate an action’s expected effects. Even more
simply, perceivers may characterize actions simply by detecting a
small number of specific cues in the environment if these cues have
been reliably associated with certain situational effects in the past
(Luan, Schooler, & Gigerenzer, 2011).
Relatedly, action characterizations should depend critically on
the counterfactual actions that perceiver compare with the per-
formed action, as these are critical for determining an action’s
effects (Equation 2). In both studies, raters were instructed to
evaluate an action’s “expected effects” by considering how it
would change the situation relative to the alternative action sug-
gested within the item. However, in more natural settings, perceiv-
ers presumably must spontaneously generate counterfactuals them-
selves—which should have large implications for action
characterizations. Returning to our ongoing example of George
Kirk, it appeared that his son James T. Kirk had less positive
characterizations of his father’s actions as interim captain of the
Kelvin than those held by others. This may have stemmed from his
general belief that there is no such thing as a “no-win situation,”






































































































970 WOOD, TOV, AND COSTELLO
George could have performed which would have both saved more
people and himself. Future studies could thus more explicitly
examine the counterfactuals that individuals spontaneously gener-
ate to determine how an action should be characterized.
Generalization to other populations of perceivers and actors.
Finally, we have argued that the conceptual templates associated
with action characterizations should be highly static regardless of
whether we are considering the actions of people from different
age groups (e.g., adolescents vs. adults), historical time periods
(e.g., students in 2014 vs. 1960), or cultures and geographic
locations (e.g., U.S. vs. Peru; Brooklyn, NY vs. Sioux City, IA).
We should even expect that individuals are communicating similar
abstract meaning through the use of action concepts regardless of
whether they are characterizing actions performed by human or
nonhuman agents (e.g., dogs, fishes, machines, governments).
Indeed, perceivers will reliably describe the movements of simple
geometric shapes such as triangles as aggressive when animated in
particular ways (Heider & Simmel, 1944). However, the scenarios
we have examined have consisted of actions nominated by college
students. Future studies could explore the generality of the rela-
tionships between action effects and characterizations observed
here in much more diverse populations of actors and actions to
more critically examine this assumption.
Such studies would be useful for understanding why certain per-
sonality traits have been hard for observers to reliably judge in certain
actors or systems. For instance, traits in the domain of conscientious-
ness (e.g., dependable) have been difficult to code reliably in dogs and
most other animal species (Gosling & John, 1999). However, under-
standing the expected effect dimension of “fulfilling commitments” as
central to dependable characterizations suggests this might arise from
departures in how judges regard animals as having commitments to
fulfill. It may be appropriate to say that certain actors simply cannot
meaningfully be regarded as performing actions which match certain
conceptual templates.
Additionally, future research may examine how conceptual tem-
plates vary across different perceivers. For instance, some group-level
differences in personality traits are likely to be due in part to how the
same actions are characterized by perceivers rather than due to dif-
ferences in actual behavioral tendencies. For instance, perceivers from
different ages, genders, or cultural groups may differ in what they
regard as constituting a kind or assertive action. More generally, there
are certainly individual differences in the action effects perceivers use
to characterize actions by particular terms, which concerns the issue of
cue utilization in person perception (Brunswik, 1956). Better under-
standing such differences should help to understand discrepancies
between self- and peer-ratings of personality traits, or between ob-
server judgments more generally.
Broader Implications
Although we have primarily framed the present framework as
filling a gap in formative trait models such as the AFA, DDA, and
PRISM frameworks, there are a number of fairly natural connec-
tions to other important areas in psychology.
Connections to Other Frameworks for
Describing Behavior
There are several ways in which this study may contribute to
other prominent approaches to the study of behavior. First, a
number of approaches to the characterization of behavior are at
highly “molecular” levels of analysis—which might involve
counting an actor’s use of specific types of words, such as pro-
fanities or first-person pronouns (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010),
use of particular facial muscles (Ekman & Rosenberg, 1997;
Scherer & Ellgring, 2007), or the number of times a participant
sighs or makes eye contact (Argyle & Dean, 1965; Kahlbaugh &
Haviland, 1994). A regularly noted limitation of such approaches
is that the meaning of the behavior can be lost at such molecular
levels of analysis—and particularly when aggregating many dif-
ferent instantiations of behavior together (Furr, 2009b; Sherman,
Nave, & Funder, 2009; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). Perhaps
reflecting this limitation, correlations between rates of molecular
behaviors with broader trait measures are often low to moderate
(Kern et al., 2013; Mehl, Gosling, & Pennebaker, 2006), and may
tend to be lower than correlations between trait measures and more
“molar” behavioral codings (e.g., whether a person has uttered a
specific profanity vs. an “insult;” Sherman et al., 2009).
The current framework should shed light on such issues. Anal-
ogous to how judges rated specific action scenarios in both studies,
we can code a molecular behavior along relevant expected effect
dimensions, which should allow us to predict why certain behav-
iors correlate more strongly with personality traits than others. For
instance, the negative correlations found between profanity use
and measures of agreeableness or conscientiousness (Kern et al.,
2013; Mehl et al., 2006) could be anticipated by the fact that
profanity use tends to have effects which fit the conceptual tem-
plates of unkind or undependable actions (e.g., cause others to feel
irritated or rejected, roughly Features #1 and 4 in Tables 5–7).
We can also burrow deeper to code specific instances of a
molecular behavior for their expected effects, as was done with the
action scenarios in the present study. This may help to more
formally understand why relationships between rates of molecular
behaviors and more general traits are not higher by showing that
specific instances of a molecular behavior have different expected
effects, and thus have different meanings. Coding each instance of
a behavior by its expected effects in a situation should allow us to
establish why not all instances of a behavior are equally diagnostic
of a trait like kindness. More molar characterizations of an indi-
vidual’s behavior—for example, counts of a person’s number of
insults versus counts of usage of more specific profanities—may
have greater correlations with trait measures because they capture
more of a behavior’s meaning in this way (Sherman et al., 2009).
For instance, raters probably will not code an individual’s utter-
ance of a profanity after stubbing a toe in private as an “insult”
because it is unlikely to cause others to feel more rejected.
More generally, current approaches to coding an individual’s ac-
tions for the most part involve coding them along highly molecular
levels, or along more abstract characterizations (e.g., “S/he acted
assertively;” Fleeson, 2001; Funder, Furr, & Colvin, 2000; Furr,
2009a). However, the current framework suggests that it may be
useful and important to code an individual’s actions for their expected
effects as well. This is because, as our results suggest, an action’s
expected effects likely have a central role in determining whether
abstract characterizations can be validly applied to actions in the first
place.
Implications for psychometric theory and test development.
Psychometricians have long wrestled with the issue of how to






































































































971CHARACTERIZING ACTIONS BY THEIR EXPECTED EFFECTS
ments; Cronbach, Gleser, Nanda, & Rajaratnam, 1972; McDonald,
2003). When applied to behavioral traits, this essentially concerns
the same issue examined here: If we want to develop a test of
assertiveness, what is the universe of possible items that represent
assertiveness? As noted by McDonald (2003), psychometricians
have largely adopted statistical techniques to establish the rele-
vance of items to a trait—such as seeing which item correlates best
with a criterion or with other items in the set—but there is an
important sense in which these questions concern semantic or
logical considerations rather than purely statistical ones.
The model delineated here suggests a solution to this question: A
behavioral concept’s domain can be understood as those behaviors
which fit a specified template of expected effects. Formally repre-
sented conceptual templates of the sort that we have identified here
could have a range of useful psychometric applications. Operationally
defining a characteristic in this manner may allow us to “fix” or
“anchor” the meaning of a concept, which can be used to help
generate items. Test developers may compare generated items with a
trait’s conceptual templates to ensure that variation in item endorse-
ment corresponds to the necessary pattern of expected effects.
Identifying behavioral domains with conceptual templates also
provides an alternative perspective on why traits such as depend-
ability and kindness covary. Rather than covarying due to sharing
common causes (Cattell, 1950; McCrae & Costa, 2008; Wood et
al., in press), many traits should covary in large part due to having
overlapping conceptual templates. That is, some of the effects that
identify an action as an instance of one trait may simultaneously
identify it as an instance of the other. This would be consistent
with an understanding of correlated trait terms such as bold and
confident as representing nuances in meaning (McCrae, 2014;
Wiggins, 2003), and of broad trait dimensions such as the Big Five
and HEXACO dimensions as representing summaries of action
tendencies with particularly important effects an actor has on their
social environments rather than approximations of particularly
important sources of the actor’s own behavior (Buss, 2011; Gold-
berg, 1981; Wood, in press).
Implications for the Identification of Important
Features of Situations
As we have regarded action characterizations as principally
describing patterns of an action’s expected effects on the situation,
better specifying conceptual templates should simultaneously help
to identify important situational features. This understanding par-
allels an understanding within interdependence theory, where the-
orists have noted that formal representations action and situation
concepts should help to understand the links between persons,
situations, and behavior (Holmes, 2004; Kelley, 1997). Many of
the situational features identified here as potentially necessary to
specify conceptual templates extend beyond those most commonly
found in interdependence and game theoretical frameworks, which
typically consist of overall utility values for the individuals in-
volved in the situation (Gintis, 2009; Kelley et al., 2003). Our
analyses suggest that many of the situational features that underlie
important action characterizations involve more specific costs and
benefits (e.g., “effort expenditure” and “achievement goals” for
industrious actions) and other features of more ambiguous posi-
tivity (e.g., “exposure to social situations” for outgoing actions).
More generally, the current framework should supplement the
wide range of approaches to the identification of important aspects
of situations. Many investigators have attempted to identify im-
portant situational features as those which characterize naturalis-
tically occurring situations (e.g., “What were you doing at [a
particular time] yesterday?;” Pervin, 1976; Rauthmann et al.,
2014). This framework ultimately more closely resembles ap-
proaches which have focused on identifying features of trait-
relevant situations, but differs in an interesting respect. Most
previous approaches in this family have focused on identifying
situational features which elicit trait-relevant actions (Saucier,
Bel-Bahar, & Fernandez, 2007; Ten Berge & De Raad, 2001). The
current framework represents an inversion of this usual approach:
We may be able to identify many important situational features as
those that are necessary to identify an action as trait-relevant by
being predictable outcomes of such actions.4
Formally representing the impact of situational features on
trait-related actions. As noted by Hölldobler and Wilson
(2009), “concepts, when skeletonized, lend themselves to mathe-
matical modeling, and they can be of significant heuristic value
and explanatory power” (p. 309; Hofstadter & Sander, 2013).
Nowhere is this idea illustrated more dramatically than the expan-
sive game theoretical literature on cooperation. As noted earlier, a
cooperative action can be formally defined by a simple conceptual
template of an action expected to cost the actor while benefitting
someone else (Nowak, 2006). However, from this simple template
theorists have mathematically derived a wide number of formal
predictions of when cooperative actions should be observed, and
strategies for the facilitation of such actions (Axelrod & Hamilton,
1981; Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Gächter,
Renner, & Sefton, 2008; Nowak, 2006; Nowak, Tarnita, & Wilson,
2010). Correctly specifying the conceptual templates for other
important action characteristics should allow us to extend these
techniques to other trait domains.
This should help understand a range of interesting phenomena in
personality psychology, such as why individuals have low levels of
behavioral traits they might describe as desirable (e.g., depend-
ability, confidence). One way to understand this is that individuals
might ideally prefer their actions to have trait-identifying effects,
but in practice these trait-identifying effects are often negatively
associated with other valued outcomes. For instance, most people
would ideally prefer to express their desires and values through
their actions (Feature 7 in Tables 5–7) which would in turn help
identify their actions as confident or bold. However, for many
people such actions could particularly increase their risk of rejec-
tion (Feature 3), require an inordinate expenditure of time and
energy (Feature 8), or come at other costs.
More generally, it is the pattern of interdependence existing
between the diverse effects of one’s available actions which may
be central to defining situations and understanding their influence
on behavior (Halevy, Chou, & Murnighan, 2012; Kelley et al.,
4 This difference may be particularly well-illustrated by a comparison
with Ten Berge and De Raad (2001). Both studies begin by asking
participants to suggest situation-action scenarios that illustrate different
trait concepts (generically: “I was in Situation X, I did Action Y”). How-
ever, whereas Ten Berge and De Raad identified situation features that
regularly elicited trait-related actions, this study identified situation fea-
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2003; Reis & Holmes, 2012). Understanding (a) how we can
identify action concepts as subsets of these expected effects and
(b) how these effects covary with other outcomes the actor values
in particular situations should allow us to formally represent how
environmental features impact traits in the way that they do. For
instance: The declines in violence over historical time seem to be
partly due to the effects of strong governments on increasing the
negative correlation between “harming others” (Feature 21) and a
range of self-benefitting outcomes (e.g., Features 11, and 18;
Pinker, 2011). Entrance into adulthood may tend to increase de-
pendable behaviors by increasing the extent to which “completing
commitments” is associated with “connection with others” versus
“social rejection” (Features 2, 3, and 12; Wood, Gosling, & Potter,
2007). And regional prevalence of infection diseases is likely
negatively associated with trait extraversion because such diseases
increase the correlation between “interacting with others” and
“physical harm” (Features 12 and 21; Schaller & Murray, 2008).
Numerous other examples can be given.
Conclusion
In psychology, the characterization of specific actions by terms
such as assertive, polite, and honest has regularly followed from
perceiver judgments of prototypicality, or the direct translation of
a specific action into such terms by one or more perceivers (Buss
& Craik, 1983; Fleeson, 2001; Wood & Roberts, 2006). However,
both methods leave unanswered questions regarding the specific
processes by which perceivers reach these judgments. We have
argued that perceivers apply such characterizations to an action
when their expected effects match relatively invariant conceptual
templates. In a fundamental way, these conceptual templates can
be understood as definitions of important action concepts (Holmes,
2004; Kelley, 1997).
Our goal was to better articulate the conceptual templates associ-
ated with socially important action characterizations. We found that
how perceivers characterize an action can be very highly predicted by
its expected effects, in ways that were both highly sensible and highly
consistent across two distinct sets of action scenarios. Although future
work will undoubtedly refine these conceptual templates, this repre-
sents an important step in delineating the elements necessary to
formalize important trait and action concepts, and detailing how they
can be empirically identified. Apart from the most direct applications
to the formalization of action and person concepts, further improve-
ments in the specification of conceptual templates hold deep promise
to improve our understanding of how personality traits relate to
behavior and situations.
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Appendix
Self-Rated Items Used to Estimate Trait-Diagnosticities in Study 1
Action characterization Trait self-descriptions
1. Industrious/Hard-working vs. Lazy/Unproductive M(hardworking/productive, Industriousness)
2. Organized/Neat vs. Disorganized/Messy M(Organized, -disorganized/messy)
3. Careful/Cautious vs. Impulsive/Spontaneous M(Careful, -impulsive)
4. Dependable/Reliable vs. Undependable/Unreliable M(Dependable/reliable, -undependable/unreliable)
5. Intelligent/Smart vs. Unintelligent/Foolish Smart/intelligent
6. Kind-hearted/Caring vs. Unfriendly/Cold M(Kindhearted/caring, -unfriendly/cold)
7. Truthful/Honest vs. Untruthful/Dishonest Truthful/honest
8. Confident/Self-assured vs. Afraid/Scared M(Competent/capable, -afraid/scared)
9. Bold/Assertive vs. Submissive/Unassertive M(Assertive/bold, brave/adventurous)
10. Outgoing/Sociable vs. Bashful/Shy Sociable/outgoing
Note. M(X,Y) indicate that diagnosticities of two items (X and Y) were averaged; -Y indicates that the trait
diagnosticity for item Y was reversed.
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